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Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Cameroon 
 
Ernest Bamou and William A. Masters 
 
 
Cameroon is among the more prosperous countries in Africa, thanks to relatively abundant 
agricultural land and offshore petroleum. These spurred an economic boom from unification of 
the country in 1972 until 1986, which was followed by a decade of decline from 1986 to 1995 
and a limited recovery since then (Appendix Figure 1). In terms of social indicators, primary 
school enrollment rates fell from nearly 100 percent in the 1980s to 62 percent in 1997 (World 
Bank 2002), and child mortality rates worsened from 139 per thousand in 1990 to 151 per 
thousand in 1995, and it was still 149 in 2006 (World Bank 2006, 2008). Recovery over the past 
decade has been significant, but poverty remains widespread. In 2001, 17 percent of the 
population had incomes under one dollar per day in purchasing power parity terms, and 51 
percent had incomes under two dollars per day (World Bank 2006). 
Prior to the economic crisis of the late 1980s, Cameroon’s development strategy efforts 
were managed through a series of five-year Development Plans. In these, agriculture was 
described as the priority sector and the government intervened massively in rural development, 
both directly through the establishment of state-owned agro-industries, rural corporations and  
settlements, and also indirectly through various support programs. Later reforms and the 
devaluation of 1994 improved performance through allowing more market incentives to play a 
role. In this chapter we use the methodology of Anderson et al. (2008) to quantify the evolution 
of those distortions to farmer incentives, measuring the incidence of government policy on 
producers and consumers each year in Cameroon from 1961 to 2004. For each of the major 
activities we compute Nominal Rates of Assistance (NRAs), which are then aggregated into a 
variety of other indexes.  
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief overview of 
agriculture’s role in the economy. A summary of the main agricultural policy incentives, 
interventions and reforms is then provided, before describing the country’s growth performance 
over time. The main section computes and analyzes government distortions to agricultural 





Agriculture’s role in the economy 
 
 
Cameroon is a bilingual country, whose French and English speaking regions became 
independent on January 1, 1960 and October 1, 1961 respectively, and were united in 1972. At 
independence about 85 percent of the population lived in rural areas and relied principally on 
agriculture for their livelihoods. Since then, the country has urbanized faster than most other 
African countries. By 2005, the share of the population living in rural areas is estimated to have 
fallen below 50 percent, as compared to an African average of 64 percent (FAOSTAT 2006).   
  As oil exports grew after 1977, the resulting Dutch Disease contributed to stagnation in 
both industry and agriculture, with a boom in the oil and services sectors that at times generated 
more than two-thirds of GDP (Benjamin and Devarajan 1989, Blandford et al. 1995). Agriculture 
was particularly vulnerable to Dutch Disease, due to lower returns to growing both exportable 
and import-competing products, and with only limited demand for nontradable foods. Shifts in 
production within the sector are described by Courade and Alary (1994), Janin (1996) and Touna-
Mama (1996). Changes in input use were also important, particularly after the government phase-
out of subsidies for fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides in 1989–92 (Ndoye and Kaimowitz 2000, 
Sunderlin et al. 2000).  
 
 
Main agricultural policy incentives, interventions and reforms 
 
 
The evolution of Cameroon’s agricultural policy may broadly be divided into four phases. The 
first phase runs from independence to the end of the 1960s, and is marked by a continuation of 
French and British colonial agricultural policies and institutions. The second, characterized by a 
proliferation of new agricultural interventions, covers the late 1960s to late 1970s. A third phase 
marked by attempts at agricultural policy reform goes from the late 1970s to the late 1980s, and 
the fourth phase, dominated by agricultural policy liberalization, began around 1990 and is 




Colonial agricultural policies and institutions 
 
Cameroon was colonized first by the Germans (1894-1916) and later by the French (1916-60) 
and British (1916-61) with the country partitioned between them, and strong dualism between 
European-owned large-scale plantations and Cameroonian peasant small-holdings. Agricultural 
policies were closely linked to the politics of colonialism, as well as the changing economic 
conditions in the colonies. Emphasis was placed exclusively on export crops. Development of the 
indigenous food sector received little attention or was actively discouraged because it conflicted 
with the labor needs of the European-owned large-scale plantations. Numerous measures were 
taken by the administration to stimulate the creation and expansion of plantations: large expanses 
of fertile land were appropriated from natives without compensation and given to planters; 
taxation, forced labor, and other methods were used to insure an abundant and cheap supply labor 
to plantations; and a network of transportation and marketing facilities was developed to serve 
the plantation areas and link them to the coast (Ntangsi 1988).  
During the second half of colonial rule, colonial powers shifted their emphasis to peasant 
production which provided the basis for the rapid expansion of exports (Secretariat Général du 
Gouvernement 1961). With the expansion of peasant production, an attempt was made to extend 
roads and railways beyond the plantation areas into the major peasant producing areas.
1 A 
number of agricultural institutions were established to provide extension and marketing services 
to farmers. On the French side, the most important of these was the ‘Secteurs de Modernisation’ 
(SEM), financed by FIDES (Fonds d’Investissement pour le Développement Economique). It 
provided a tight network of technique and crop-oriented extension services and handling seed 
production, pest control, and some agro-processing activities (rice milling). Furthermore, there 
was the SAP (Société Africaine de Prévoyance) which provided credit and the Caisse de 
Stabilisation which handled marketing. Specialized research institutes were also established for 
cotton (CFDT, the Compagnie Française pour le Développement des Fibres et Textiles), for 
cocoa and coffee (IFAC, the Institut des Fruits et Agrumes), and for palm oil (IRHO, the Institut 
de Recherches sur les Huiles et Oléagineux). On the British side, there was less emphasis on 
smallholders and priority was given to private large-scale plantations operated by the Cameroon 
                                                 
1  In order to link the important cocoa economy of South-Central Cameroon to the coast, the railway was extended 
from Douala to Yaoundé and from Otélé to Mbalmayo.  
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Development Corporation, Elders and Fyffes Ltd., and others. Extension was provided by the 
Department of Agriculture, Cooperatives, and Community Development, the marketing of export 




The post-independence period saw substantial continuity in the colonial agricultural policies and 
institutional structure. Until 1972, the country was ruled under a federal system with two states, 
East and West Cameroon. The DARA (Department of Agriculture and Rural Animation) was 
created in 1964 under the Federal Ministry of Planning to coordinate the agricultural 
development efforts of the two states. The extension system was then based on what has been 
referred to as the ‘diffusion/modernization model’, with three main features: it was centered on 
the peasantry as the primary agents for agricultural development, it involved the transformation 
of peasants through the progressive diffusion and adoption of innovations, and it relied on only 
limited government intervention (research, extension, availability of inputs, etc.) to obtain 
changes in peasant behavior in view of their autonomy in decision-making. This approach was 
implicitly adopted in the first Five-year Development Plan of the country (1961-1965) and, to 
some degree, in the second (1966-1970).  
Signs of dissatisfaction with peasant agriculture were noted in the second plan, with the 
clear statement that, notwithstanding the satisfactory performance of the agricultural sector, 
growth in output had come from increases in area under cultivation and not from yield gains. The 
second plan envisaged experimentation with other forms of intervention structures in agriculture 
and new forms of production, and in 1972 the unification of the country and creation of a new 




As in most countries around the world, the late 1960s and early 1970s saw a movement towards 
greater intervention in agriculture, with the direct involvement of government in functions 
hitherto carried out by the private sector such as agricultural input distribution and marketing of 
food crops. In Cameroon, increased government intervention and centralization of decision-
making involved concentrating government expenditure in the state plantation sector, with almost  
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complete neglect of smallholders. In fact there was increased indirect taxation of peasants 
through the marketing board, the Office National de Commercialisation de Produits de Base 
(ONCPB), which had been created mainly for cocoa and coffee. This period also witnessed the 
multiplication of new intervention institutions and new forms of production as recommended by 
the second plan.
2 By 1970 a total of ten parastatal development agencies had been created and 
fourteen more were formed during the Third Plan (1971-75). The Fourth Plan (1976-80) in 
addition to continuing the projects of the Third Plan, attempted a further expansion of 
intervention. Some twenty new projects were proposed, most of which were never implemented 
because foreign aid donors were no longer willing to fund them. 
The growth of Cameroon’s state-led agricultural interventions had been supported by 
donors for a variety of reasons. These agencies were to be run as quasi-private enterprises, with 
administrative, technical and financial autonomy and therefore potential efficiency. In addition, 
most of the projects aimed to combine marketable output with basic farmer needs, an idea that 
fitted very well within the basic-needs-approach to rural development widely adopted by donors 
and the international intellectual community during the early 1970s. But Cameroon’s attempt to 
create a modern agricultural sector through this kind of intervention proved to be very costly and 
had only a marginal impact on total agricultural output. The proliferation of new institutions and 
structures was particularly counter-productive. Agencies were supervised by different 
government ministries with little provision for the coordination of activities. Lines of 
responsibility often overlapped, agencies worked at cross purposes, and leaders were occupied in 
power conflicts among themselves. The poor performance of the interventionist strategy led to 




The year 1977 saw the start of Cameroon’s oil boom. In that year farmers were offered a large 
increase in real producer prices for cocoa, coffee, and cotton. Those gains were quickly eroded by 
subsequent inflation, however, and on balance agricultural production was heavily burdened 
during the boom years.   
                                                 
2  The second plan had recommended the expansion of the estate sector (either privately or publicly owned), rural 
settlement projects to move the population from densely populated to sparsely populated areas, specialized crop 
development corporations charged with organizing and supervising the production of specific crops grown by small 
farmers, and integrated rural development projects stimulating production as well as providing social services.  
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During the boom, three distinct kinds of resource misallocation became increasingly 
severe. The most fundamental were classic Dutch Disease misallocations due to unsustainable 
price incentives, which limited investment in smallholder agriculture. Prior to the oil boom, the 
sectoral balance had already leaned heavily against agriculture as a whole, and within agriculture 
resources were concentrated in the relatively small estate sector which produced no more that 10 
percent of total agricultural output. These biases worsened during the boom, which made 
smallholder farming even less attractive and increased the number of unskilled workers seeking 
non-farm work.  
A second kind of misallocation occurred within government institutions, due to 
unsustainable management structures. Prior to the oil boom, an extreme centralization of 
decision-making had resulted in heavy red tape and fragmentation of responsibilities in the 
bureaucracy and the extension service. This resulted in poor policy implementation, and 
misallocation of what little expenditure was targeted to smallholder agriculture during the boom.   
A third kind of misallocation was under-investment in new technology. Although 
Cameroon did have a significant public agricultural research and development program, during 
the boom there were few incentives for technology adoption, so yields for most crops stagnated 
or declined (MINAGRI 1980).  
All three kinds of problems were widely recognized in Cameroon during the oil boom, but 
significant policy change did not take place until the boom ended and the debt crisis of the mid-
1980s made reform unavoidable. 
 
Ongoing liberalization since the late 1980s 
 
Faced with a brutal fall in living standards after 1986, the government felt it had to implement 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) supported by international donors. Sector-specific policy 
reforms of the SAPs in agriculture included both privatization and liberalization. Those reforms 
targeted input production, transfer of technology and know-how through research and 
development, marketing, training and information as well as sanitary and phytosanitary control. 
They aimed to guarantee food security, promote and diversify agricultural exports and increase 
income in the rural area.  
Reforms which attracted the greatest attention involved liberalization of product 
marketing. The Food Crop Development Authority (MIDEVIV) and the National Produce  
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Marketing Board (ONCPB), which had controlled cocoa and coffee, were both liquidated along 
with many other development agencies. Their withdrawal improved average incentives, but for 
many products and regions there were very few private traders available, so for these farmers 
marketing costs actually rose, at least temporarily. This deterioration of local marketing 
conditions inhibited farmers’ production, which in turn limited the speed and number of new 
entrants into private trading to serve these markets.   
Liberalization of international trade involved gradual abandonment of the existing 
quantitative restrictions, and the adoption of a simplified tax system. With the adoption in 1994 
of the Regional Fiscal Reform Program (RFRP) initiated at the sub-regional level through the 
Economic and Monetary Community for Central Africa (CEMAC), the international tax system 
of agricultural and food products was simplified and average taxation rates were reduced (Bamou, 
Njinkeu and Douya 2003).  
On the inputs side, one particularly important set of changes were the Sub-Sector 
Fertilizer Reform Program (SSFRP) launched in 1987 with the assistance of USAID, and the 
Special Program for the Importation of Fertilizers (SPIF) launched in 1988 with the support of 
the European Development Fund  (EDF). Their goal was to put in place an effective private 
system for importing and distributing fertilizers, but Ntsama (2000) found that importers formed 
an oligopoly that enabled them to fix sale prices at an unusually high level relative to cif values. 
In general, Ntsama argued that SSFRP and SPIF programs were more concerned with serving 
existing importers than with expanding the size of the market: for example, SSFRP did not offer a 
credit mechanism to expand the number of farmers able to buy fertilizers. 
Retrenchment in the public sector hit all kinds of services, including particularly 
agricultural research for new crop varieties and growing techniques. Despite the promising results 
recorded by Cameroonian research programs, and despite the desperate need for yield-increasing 
technologies at that time, funding levels fell significantly. In nominal terms, agricultural research 
institutes received CFAF 5910 million in 1984/85 (of which 95 percent was from state 
subventions), whereas between 1992 and 1994 they received only CFAF 5720 million of which 
only 58 percent was the state subvention, and 42 percent had to be sourced from external 
resources (IRAD 1996). 
The public national system for agricultural education was virtually abandoned, with 
increasingly degraded facilities and weak staff. Its training programs were unsuitable, current 
budgets and equipment insignificant, installations and equipment poor, trainers demoralized and  
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lacking regular training or means of work. Private educational institutions emerged, and were 
better equipped with human and financial resources, but they covered a limited range of skills 
and served only some regions of the country (Matiké, Bidja and Kapto 2001).   
The national extension system was less affected by the cutbacks, although it did face a 
slowing down of its activities. The National Agricultural Extension and Research Program 
(NPARV) launched in 1990 by the government through MINAGRI and with the financial 
assistance of the World Bank made it possible to reinforce the extension services, but the value of 
extension to farmers constrained by the limited availability of new technologies from research.  
After the liquidation of the Cameroon Agricultural Bank (‘Crédit Agricole’) in 1997, only 
a few parastatal or private agro-industrial enterprises were able to offer farm production loans. 
Smaller and more remote farmers have no access at all to formal credit. The emergence of 
financial intermediaries has been limited by high risk and limited availability of collateral, so 
farmers must rely on loans from family members and local informal lenders. There has been 
some micro-finance available through donor-funded institutions,
3 but these remain poorly 
distributed in the country and sometimes lack credibility and professionalism, with no linkage 
between them and commercial banks.  
A very important and ambitious area of reform concerns the use of forest land, launched 
in 1994 with the approval of the new Forestry Law (Law No. 94-01). Reforms in forest use are 
based on an effort to clarify the rules of the game and enforce them with strong institutions that 
enjoy high-level political support; to draw a clear separation of functions between public 
institutions and private entities and collaborative frameworks to enable collaboration among 
actors; to ensure that conservation of globally relevant biodiversity contributes to, rather than 
hinders local economies; and to use transparency and public information in the fight against 
corruption and vested interests. As detailed by Kazianga and Masters (2006), changing property 
rights can have a powerful influence on the adoption and impacts of new technology in this 
context, particularly for cocoa which is typically planted in forest areas.  
Finally, despite the withdrawal of the government from most agricultural activities, the 
semi-arid North part of country has continued to benefit ever since independence from special 
government agricultural policies (food grants, food crops production incentives, cotton extension 
                                                 
3 The World Bank participated in funding the FIMAC (Investment Fund for Agricultural and Community Micro-
Projects) project which comprised 160 branches, 31000 adherents and it funded 3000 projects to the overall amount 
of CFAF 2 million during the period 1989-1998. Canada and France provided their backing to the Fund for Rural 
Savings and Self-Managed Credits (CVECA) project.    
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and marketing services, etc.). These have typically been preserved over time, although with 
varying effectiveness.   
 
 
Growth performance and agricultural output  
 
 
Before and during its oil boom, Cameroon experienced rapid economic expansion.  From 1973 to 
1986, incomes grew at more than 7 percent per year (Appendix Figure 1). Growth was led by 
unsustainable expansion of agricultural area, then petroleum exports and government borrowing 
(Benjamin and Devarajan 1989). Oil revenue shot from zero to 46 percent of exports between 
1978 and 1982, and domestic absorption soared to 103 percent of GDP, driven by massive 
government spending (World Bank 2004). In terms of trade policy, resource abundance allowed 
the government to pursue an inward looking import-substitution industrialization strategy, 
supported by a restrictive trade policy and fiscal subsidies. This contributed to higher inflation 
(10 percent over the period of 1977-1985), primarily due to price increases for non-tradables and 
higher real wages, as measured by rising unit labor costs and an appreciating real exchange rate. 
The resulting deterioration in competitiveness led to a sharp decline in non-oil exports 
(agriculture and manufactured goods) while imports surged with domestic absorption, 
contributing to the deterioration of the trade balance, which eventually led to the unsustainable 
indebtedness of the 1980s.  
The accumulated consequences of these policy choices were slowly unwound in the long 
downturn from 1986 to 1993, and the country did not fully recover until after the currency 
devaluation of 1994 and structural reforms of the second half of the 1990s. During the downturn, 
GDP contracted by 5 percent per year on average, such that per capita income in 1993 was almost 
half its 1986 level (Appendix Figure 1). Meanwhile, current public spending evolved from 11 
percent to 19 percent of GDP while investment decreased drastically from 12.4 percent of GDP 
in 1986 to 3.5 percent in 1993. Investment rates were driven down in part by growth in external 
debt service payments.  
The economic recovery started in 1994 and continued through 2005, thanks to the 
combined efforts of authorities to implement more prudential economic policies aimed at 
restoring economic stability, trade and fiscal policies undertaken to conform to the Central  
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African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) provisions and the nominal 50 percent 
devaluation of the CFAF in January 1994. However, the structural constraints of domestic 
demand and supply limited response to the devaluation, and its incentive effects were short-lived.  
Annual average real GDP growth of about 5 percent between 1995 and 2003 was spurred 
by the invigorated non-oil private sector, despite problems with the energy sector that inhibited 
growth in general and that of the manufacturing industry in particular. The spike of inflation that 
followed the CFAF devaluation gradually subsided during this period, and public finance 
improved due to prudential budgetary policy and changes in the tax administration. Non-oil 
government revenue rose by more than 4 percent of GDP, entirely eliminating the budget deficit 
and generating surpluses from the year 2000. The external debt ratio fell between 2000 and 2003 
from 77 to 44 percent of GDP.  
Financial and fiscal recovery after 1995 has been reflected in rising living standards. For 
example, the poverty index decreased by about 13 percent between 1996 and 2001 (World Bank 
2005), largely thanks to recovery of the agricultural sector. Agriculture has registered remarkable 
growth but still has not brought the country’s food production per capita back to the level enjoyed 
in the early years of independence.  
On the trade side, Cameroon was a net exporter of agricultural products prior to the crisis 
period. The 1994 devaluation had a significant but quickly eroded effect, as imports declined but 
then rose again in 1996 while exports fell due to increased civil service salaries and real 
appreciation. A further boom in imports was recorded with the launching of the Chad/Cameroon 
pipeline construction in 1998, while total exports dropped significantly due to the enforcement of 
the new forestry law forbidding the export of whole logs for most kinds of trees. On average, rice 
and cereal imports increased sharply in the 1990s despite price hikes due to the devaluation. 
Cameroon has been frequently cited as one of the few countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to 
have achieved satisfactory agricultural development. But past growth was based on an early and 
unsustainable expansion of cropped area, with very limited growth of land productivity. Area 
grew sharply in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly for coffee and groundnuts, but growth then 
slowed markedly, with only cotton and sorghum expanding in the 1980s and only roots and 
tubers expanding in the 1990s (Appendix Figure 2). Despite the significant growth in fertilizer 
use, there has been relatively little yield growth for the key crops (Appendix Figures 3 and 4). 
The net result in terms of per capita production of both food and non-food crops is shown in 
Figure 1, which suggests Cameroon has done little better than the average for Sub-Saharan Africa  
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sine the late 1960s. These trends in output are influenced by changes in resources, technology and 
incomes that shift the domestic supply and demand curves as well as by product pricing, 
particularly the distortions to agricultural incentives imposed by government policy.  
 
 
Distortions to agricultural incentives 
 
 
Farm policies in Cameroon have changed frequently since independence. The resulting 
distortions are measured and analyzed in this section, for the entire agricultural sector and 
selected agricultural products, using the methodology presented in detail in Anderson et al. 
(2008). Our key measure is the Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA), which compares domestic 
prices with the border-price equivalents that would prevail in the absence of distortions. The 
NRA is adjusted to take account of other taxes and subsidies.  
Estimated distortions are computed for all main agricultural products. We have data for 
four major exportable products (cocoa, coffee, cotton and bananas), and six basic food crops 
(plantains, maize, millet, sorghum, cassava, and other roots and tubers). There is some 
international trade in the latter group of basic food crops, both formally and informally, but in the 
Cameroonian context the quantities traded and the distances covered are too small to significantly 
influence national prices, so in our analysis these are considered nontradables.   
Three of our commodities (coffee, cocoa and cotton) are marketed as primary products 
and also after light processing. In these cases, we compute distortions to incentives for both farm 
production and off-farm processing. For coffee, the primary product is exportable but the 
processed item is importable, while cocoa is exportable. For cotton, the primary product is 
nontradable and only the processed good is exported.     
We do not compute distortion estimates for the nontradable basic food crops, since the 
domestic markets for them are not subject to significant intervention by the government. They 
play an important role when computing value-weighted averages, though, because they account 
for the lion’s share of  primary agricultural production (Figure 2).   
Since it is not possible to understand the characteristics of agricultural development with a 
sectoral view alone, the project’s methodology not only estimates the effects of direct agricultural 
policy measures (including distortions in the foreign exchange market), but it also generates  
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estimates of distortions in non-agricultural sectors for comparative evaluation.
 The NRA for 
nonagricultural tradables is used for comparison with that for agricultural tradables via the 
calculation of a Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA).  
 
 
Data sources and assumptions 
 
Our analysis begins with the quantity data needed to compute weighted averages of incentive 
effects, which themselves are derived from farm-gate agricultural prices, border prices, exchange 
rates, and fiscal data on taxes and subsidies. Production and trade volumes for cocoa, coffee, 
bananas, maize, millet, cotton, sorghum, cassava, and other roots and tubers are from FAOSTAT 
(2006). Prices at the farm gate for most exportable products are from MINAGRI (1980) for 1961 
to 1980 and MINEFI/DSCN (2004b and earlier years) for 1981 to 2003, and INS (2005) for 
2004. Exceptions are detailed here: prices for bananas are derived from the assumptions used by 
MINFOF (2006).
4 Wholesale prices for lightly processed cocoa are fob prices minus the 17 
percent cost margin estimated by CHOCOCAM, the main cocoa processing enterprise created in 
1964. Wholesale prices for coffee are from the ‘Brulerie Moderne’, created in 1955. Prices for 
cotton lint and seed cotton are from Baffes (2007), extrapolated back to 1961 from his data for 
1970. The wholesale prices of cocoa and coffee are from the National Council of Coffee and 
Cocoa (CNCC). The farmgate prices, farm-to-market margins, and wholesale prices of 
importable and non-tradable products are estimated using data from the price-monitoring 
department of the DSCN, now INS. Additional data on taxes and subsidies includes government 
payments to parastatal producers from Varlet (2002), and consumer taxes from République du 
Cameroun (2005 and earlier years). Import and export tariffs are from the sub-regional (CEMAC 
formally UDEAC) Common External Tariffs (CET).  
Except for cotton, all fob (cif) prices are unit values calculated from FAOSTAT (2006), 
as the total value of the country’s exports (imports) divided by the volume of exports (imports). 
Trade prices for cotton are compiled by Baffes (2007) from the Cotlook A index. 
Official exchange rates are from IMF (2006a and earlier years). Distortions to the 
exchange rate are computed relative to the parallel exchange rate, for which we use black market 
                                                 
4  Due to the fact that enterprises are exporting directly, MINFOF (2006) is estimating the farm-gate prices as the 
difference between the wholesale prices for primary products and the cost of transportation, storage, etc. (the mark-
up on farm-gate prices). The wholesale prices for primary products are equal to fob prices at local currency.  
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rates from 1961 to 1993 as reported by Easterly (2006), whose principal source is International 
Currency Analysis (1993 and earlier years). To complete the series after 1993 we use year-to-
year changes based on the changes in real exchange rate misalignment estimated by Elbadawi 
(2006). Figure 3 shows the evolution of the country’s real exchange rate and black market 
premium after 1980s, to show the Dutch Disease period and subsequent recovery. During the 
boom period all of the exchange rate indexes appreciated significantly. During the economic 
decline after 1986, the real effective exchange rate depreciated more slowly than the underlying 
equilibrium rate, leaving to increasing misalignment and a sustained black market premium until 
the devaluation of 1994 sharply lowered the real exchange rate. Economic recovery after the 
devaluation was associated with renewed real appreciation and a return to significant 
misalignment relative to Elbadawi’s estimate of the underlying equilibrium rate.   
The influence of exchange rate changes on our distortion estimates is shown in Figure 
3(b), for the entire 1961-2004 period. On the left axis are nominal rates, in terms of FCFA per US 
dollar. All movements are due to fluctuations in the dollar vis-à-vis the French franc and then the 
Euro, except for the jump in 1994. The official rate shows significant overvaluation, with positive 
misalignment on the right axis, through the 1960s and episodically in the 1970s. Then, as shown 
in Figure 3(a), there was some overvaluation until the 1994 devaluation whose effects were then 
gradually eroded by real appreciation. Following the methology of Anderson et al. (2008), we use 





Overall trends in agricultural distortions are shown in Tables 1 and 2 and Figures 4 and 5. The 
overall picture is clearly one of worsening price distortions during the 1960s and 1970s, followed 
by reform then reversal during the oil boom, and ultimately a period of sustained reforms after 
1986.  
  Table 1 presents five-year averages of estimated distortions to farm-level incentives for 
production of key crops affected by trade policy, along with a value-weighted average of the 
crops shown. During the 1960s, taxation of key crops was substantial, on the order of 30 to 50 
percent. These rates rose above 50 percent in the late 1970s before declining with reforms and 
fluctuating in the 1980s and 1990s; and they have remained at historically low levels since 2000.  
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The bottom section of the table presents a weighted average for all products, with taxation 
worsening to a peak of 25 percent in the late 1970s, then settling to near zero after 2000.  
Dispersion in tax rates among products also declined, to a standard deviation of less than 10 
percentage points.   
  Figure 4 provides annual value-weighted composite measures aggregated by trading 
status, for all primary agricultural products. This includes not only the exportable primary 
products shown earlier (cocoa, coffee, cotton and bananas), but also non-tradable primary 
products (plantain, maize, millet, sorghum, and cassava plus other roots and tubers). There are no 
importable primary products included in this study. On average over these crops, the burden of 
taxation facing production of exportables grew from about 15 percent in the early 1960s to a peak 
of over 50 percent in the latter 1970s, before shrinking in the late 1980s and remaining well 
below 15 percent in most years since then. We find no comparable distortion on nontradables, so 
the result is a significant anti-trade and anti-agricultural bias through the 1960s and 1970s but 
with both kinds of distortion being much less significant over the past two decades. 
  The covered products account for half or more of the value of agricultural production (at 
undistorted prices, and excluding forestry and fisheries). We guesstimate that the NRA for non-
covered farm products is zero, but a portion of them are exportable and so are adversely affected 
by distortions in the exchange rate. Table 2 presents estimated results that account for this effect, 
showing how the overall total NRA for the agricultural sector is a little less negative than for just 
covered products (see upper half of Table 2) 
  Figure 5 and the lower half of Table 2 capture policy effects on incentives for production 
of tradables in primary agriculture as opposed to those in the nonfarm sector. This is summarized 
in the relative rate of assistance (RRA). Distortions have strongly favored nonfarm (including 
agro-processing) activities, with an average rate of subsidy above 20 percent for almost all of the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s, until reforms after 1986 drew protection rates steadily down below their 
initial 1960s level. Meanwhile, primary agriculture faced worsening average tax rates from the 
early 1960s to 1977, with brief reforms that were then reversed before sustained reform began in 
1985. The net result was a relative disincentive that worsened from about 25 percent in the early 
1960s to an RRA of 64 percent in 1977, before moving towards zero in recent decades. Even in 
2000-04 it still was non-trivial at -13 percent, but that was a huge improvement for farmers over 
the pre-1980s rates.  
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The policy mix of direct and indirect taxes through fiscal policy, marketing boards, trade 
barriers, foreign exchange restrictions, and other development policies imposed a significant 
burden on farmers for the benefit of urban industry, particularly in the 1970s. The exchange rate 
distortions do not appear to have had a very significant effect on the NRAs and RRA though (see 
final two rows of Table 2). These general results are in line with those of Njinkeu (1996), who 
concludes that, ‘the performance of the exporting sectors (in Cameroon), for example agriculture, 
may be partly explained by the implicit tax resulting from protection of import-substituting 
sectors’. Reforms in the 1980s and 1990s relieved that eaerlier burden on farmers and reduced 
support to processors, with on balance some taxation of processors since the 1990s.  
Underneath these aggregates are some pronounced differences in distortions facing 
producers and consumers of particular products. Perhaps most important are the effects on policy 
across crops in primary production, influencing the welfare of farmers in different regions and the 
incentives for them to change cropping patterns. Cameroon’s broad pattern of heavy taxation 
against tree crops was typical of African countries. McMillan and Masters (2003) explain this 
tendency in terms of the time-consistency of alternative policies: in the absence of commitment 
mechanisms, governments may have a short-term incentive to set taxes such that farmers earn 
only the marginal cost of harvesting their tree crops, even at the cost of future productivity by 
discouraging tree replacement or even maintenance investments. In the Cameroonian context, the 
government’s incentive to tax tree crops could be exacerbated by the relative political influence 
in general of the forested southern areas as opposed to the drier north of the country. The 
northern region, in part because it often faced seasonal food insecurity, has benefited from special 
agricultural policies since independence.  
Summarizing our results, the significant increases in the taxation of primary agriculture 
and the subsidization of non-agriculture from the early 1960s to the late 1970s was successfully 
reversed during the 1980s. Those reforms are likely to have significantly raised farm incomes and 
farmer incentives to increase production, relative to a continuation of past policies – accounting 
for at least some of the upswing in agricultural yields and fertilizer use as well as the 





Prospects for continued agricultural policy reforms  
 
 
Through Cameroon’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) strategy of 2005-2008, 
underpinned by the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative,
5 the government of 
Cameroon has once more considered agriculture and rural development to be a key means to raise 
economic growth rates in order to further reduce poverty while maintaining macroeconomic 
stability and debt sustainability. At the same time, the ongoing multilateral trade negotiations 
under the Doha Agenda of the World Trade Organization (WTO), with their embedded market 
access, export subsides, and domestic support challenges, are expected to lead to greater 
liberalization of agricultural trade worldwide. Improving agricultural performance in such a 
context requires that more attention be given to programs for enhancing agricultural productivity 
and competitiveness. Such a program should lift supply constraints on the flow of agricultural 
products to the external market, build complementarities between formal and informal domestic 
markets, and continue reform of the institutions needed by an emerging agricultural sector. These 
goals are central to the long term development of agriculture in Cameroon. Such a development 
approach depends mainly on improving governance and combatting corruption, strengthening 
legal security for investment in general and agricultural investment in particular, and raising the 
quantity and quality of infrastructures as well as key public services such as research and 
education. Government actions in these areas will then make it more worthwhile for enterprises 
to invest in productive techniques, and to diversify production in a sustainable manner.   
The negative effect of corruption on the development of all sectors, including agriculture, 
is very well known. According to Transparency International, Cameroon topped the list of the 
most corrupt countries in the world in 1998 and 1999. The country has done a bit better in recent 
years. However, it still holds a dishonorable place in this shameful hit parade. One can still 
consider corruption to be endemic in the country, and reducing corruption remains a very high 
priority. The government has formed an ad hoc committee to coordinate the work of observers 
and groups carrying out anti-corruption work in every ministry and public service.  
                                                 
5 On May 1, 2006 Cameroon reached its completion point under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) Initiative and became the 19th country to reach that point. Debt relief to Cameroon under HIPC is expected 
to be approximately US$1.267 billion in 1999 Net Present Value (NPV) terms, equivalent to a 27 percent NPV 
reduction of Cameroon's debt after traditional debt relief. This will reduce Cameroon's future debt service payments 
by about US$4.9 billion in nominal terms (IMF 2006b).  
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The development of basic infrastructure, notably inland and cross-border road 
infrastructure is crucial for the enhancement of the agricultural production and the promotion of 
agricultural exports. The development of the inland infrastructure is expected to determine the 
competitiveness of subsistence agriculture, an important source of input for the ago-industrial 
sector as well as the cross-border infrastructure will enhance the sub-regional agricultural 
competitiveness which can constitutes platform for the involvement in the global agricultural 
market.  
Improvements in agricultural productivity are needed to raise the payoffs from new 
investment, and thereby induce farmers to update their production techniques. A number of 
public goods are involved, calling for government intervention in areas such as quality standards, 
education and training, access to information and communication technologies, and so forth. 
These public investments are important not only for the productivity of existing activities, but 
also for the emergence of new ones. Currently exports are limited to only a few primary products, 
as shown by the Export Diversification Index (EDI) of UNCTAD (2001) and the primary 
commodities’ share of total of exports calculated by Bonaglia and Fukasaku (2003).
6 Improved 
incentives as well as appropriate public investments will lead to new exports, but towards which 
agricultural products should export promotion be directed? Bamou and Bamou (1999) gives an 
insight to such a question by identifying 19 non-oil non-traditional competitive and profitable 
exports, of which 4 are primary agriculture. Growth in these sectors has been stifled by prices 
below world levels, and their emergence in the future could be crucial to help agriculture play the 
historical role it played elsewhere throughout the world, in inducing food security, increasing the 
savings rate and funding an emerging manufacturing sector.  
The extent to which the agricultural sector is directly affected by developments in world 
markets for agricultural products, sheds light on a country’s interests in the ongoing agricultural 
multilateral negotiations. Given the fact that those negotiations could provide an opportunity to 
examine key issues with important implications for developing countries’ agricultural sector in 
general and that of Cameroon in particular, the latter will need to focus its negotiating positions 
on preference erosion, tariff escalation and tariff peaks, tariff rate quotas, export subsidies, 
                                                 
6 A higher value of the EDI and PCS indicates a greater degree of export concentration. UNCTAD (2001) shows that 
in 2001 Cameroon is the most concentrated country in its trade with EDI = 0.90, even compared to some poorer 
countries like Senegal (EDI = 0.77) or Mozambique (EDI = 0.83). In like manner, Bonaglia and Fukasaku (2003) 
show that in 2000, despite the slight decrease of the PCS of Cameroon (from 0.99 between 1966 and 1970 to 0.97 
between 1996 and 2000), it was still higher as compared to that of other middle income countries (0.86 for Botswana 
and 0.88 for Ghana and Kenya between 1996 and 2000).  
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domestic subsidies, capacity building, state trading, special and differential treatment, and 
consideration of multi-functional character of agriculture, especially as it relates to food security. 
To improve market access for Cameroon’s agricultural products, the negotiations should 
strive to remove remaining non-tariff barriers and reduce tariff peaks and tariff escalation in 
developed country markets. The country could offer to reduce the level of its agricultural tariff 
binding and set it closer to the current applied tariff level by locking in at the current level of 
commitment within CEMAC. Further liberalization of non-agricultural tariffs could also reduce 
the bias against agricultural exports. This would improve policy predictability and encourage 
investment and associated spillover effects on efficiency and market access. 
Overall, implementation of the agreement on domestic support to agriculture increased 
imbalances in the legitimate use of these trade- and incentive-distorting measures. The agreement 
legalized the use of these measures by developed countries while developing countries were 
curtailing their use, and it failed to properly define the non-trade concerns that should be taken 
into account in implementing them (Shirotori 2000). Cameroon should request reform of each of 
these dimensions, so that there are new incentives for deeper liberalization in the input sectors 
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Figure 1: FAO indexes of net farm output per capita of food and nonfood products in Cameroon 













































 Figure 2: Shares of covered products in the gross value of production, Cameroon, 1966 to 2003 






































































































Source: Authors’ spreadsheet based on FAOSTAT prices  
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Figure 3: Foreign exchange rates, Cameroon, 1980 to 2004  
(a) Real exchange rates, 1980 to 2004 (2004 = 100) 
 



























































































































Official rate Parallel rate
Undistorted rate Misalignment index (right scale)  
Note: Author’s estimate of undistorted rates based on the methodology of Anderson et al. (2008). 
Sources: Official exchange rates from IFS (2006), black market/parallel rates from Easterly 























Figure 4: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable and all
a agricultural products, Cameroon, 



















Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
a. The total NRA can be above or below the exportables average because assistance to 
nontradables and non-product specific assistance is also included.  
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Figure 5: Nominal rates of assistance to all nonagricultural tradables, all agricultural tradable 
industries, and relative rates of assistance
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Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and 
nonagricultural sectors, respectively.  
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Table 1: Nominal rates of assistance to covered farm products, Cameroon, 1961 to 2004 
(percent) 
   1961-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
 
Exportables 
a, b  -22.1 -38.5 -43.7 -56.9 -40.5 -9.1 -14.1 -14.1 -5.7
Banana  -2.4 -4.3 -0.1 -1.5 -1.2 -0.9 3.1 4.5 1.1
Cocoa  -28.6 -47.8 -44.7 -60.3 -37.7 -1.9 -32.7 -34.1 -12.2
Coffee  -31.2 -31.5 -43.3 -56.2 -43.7 -15.0 -15.8 -8.7 -2.0
Cotton  n.a. n.a. -43.9 -41.7 -29.3 18.1 -4.6 -14.1 1.4
 
Nontradables 
a, c  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Maize  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Millet  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sorghum  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cassava  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other roots & tubers  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Plantain  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 
Total of covered products 
a  -3.5 -8.3 -11.6 -25.1 -19.7 -5.1 -4.6 -4.5 -1.1
Dispersion of covered products 
b   12.8 17.2 21.0 28.8 20.6 16.7 15.3 12.4 7.1
% coverage (at undistorted prices)  70 71 70 61 61 56 47 48 48
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
a. Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of production.  
b. Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean of NRAs of covered products.  
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Table 2: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to nonagricultural industries, Cameroon, 1961 to 2004 
(percent) 
    1961-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Covered products  -3.5 -8.3 -11.6 -25.1 -19.7 -5.1 -4.6 -4.5 -1.1
Non-covered products   -0.6 -1.3 0.0 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 0.9 1.4 0.3
All agricultural products  -3.3 -6.3 -8.1 -15.1 -12.2 -3.3 -1.5 -1.5 -0.3
Non-product specific (NPS) assistance   0.4 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.2
Total agricultural NRA (incl. NPS)
a  -2.3 -6.0 -7.5 -14.4 -11.4 -2.4 -1.1 -1.3 -0.1
 
Assistance to just tradables: 
   All agricultural tradables  -11.4 -24.7 -27.0 -36.9 -27.3 -5.2 -3.7 -4.2 -0.5
   All non-agricultural tradables  18.3 24.5 25.5 30.0 31.1 21.3 19.9 17.3 11.7
Relative rate of assistance, RRA
b  -22.0 -38.5 -41.9 -51.0 -43.6 -23.1 -18.8 -19.0 -13.4
 
MEMO, ignoring exchange rate 
distortions: 
  NRA, all agric. products  -1.9 -5.0 -7.4 -13.9 -10.9 -2.1 -2.1 -2.8 -0.4
  RRA (relative rate of assistance)
b  -20.0 -34.6 -41.9 -50.1 -42.6 -21.7 -21.0 -24.2 -14.7
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
a. NRAs including product-specific input subsidies and non-product-specific (NPS) assistance. Total of assistance to primary factors and 
intermediate inputs divided to total value of primary agriculture production at undistorted prices (percent). 




t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.   
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Appendix: Data sources and assumptions 
 
To provide additional detail beyond the main text, a more detailed historical timeline for the 
creation, evolution and current status of all major  parastastals involved in agricultural 
interventions is provided in Appendix Table 1. The interventions of these various statutory 
entities, and their subsequent reform, underlie many of our results. During the 1960s and 1970s a 
bewildering array of agencies with overlapping mandates were created. Almost all have since 
been liquidated or privatised, but over time these institutions imposed very large costs on the 
Cameroonian economy.  
Appendix Table 2 characterizes the country’s food situation through FAO food balance 
sheets for the first (1961) and last (2003) available years. These data show clearly the country’s 
shift towards consumption of wheat and rice, whose combined total rose from 2.2 to 14.8 percent 
of calories. Vegetable oil consumption also rose sharply, from 1.3 to 8.7 percent of calories. But 
overall dietary quality improved little: the combined total of vegetables and fruits stayed roughly 
constant (although with some shift from plantains to more nutritious fruits and vegetables), and 
consumption of anumal products rose only slightly.   
Appendix Table 3 provides additional characterization of economic and social conditions 
in the country, through some of the most relevant available development indicators presented at 
five year intervals. The slightly rising fertility rate from 1960 to 1980 is consistent with the 
absence of significant real income growth until the late 1970s, and resulted in a rising child 
dependency ratio for an additional decade to 1990 before that aspect of demographic structure 
could improve. But continued population growth in a mostly-rural country ensures that rural 
population density continues to rise, leaving less and less land per rural person. The structure of 
the economy has fluctuated with oil revenues, and foreign aid per capita declined in the 1990s but 
has since recovered. Health statistics show a mixed picture, with mortality improving slightly 
while malnutrition rates worsen; this is consistent with successful disease control in the context 
of continued poverty. The poverty-gap data, suggest some improvement from the mid-1990s to 
the the turn of the century, but with only two years of observation no clear conclusion can be 
reached. 
Appendix Table 4 shows each commodity’s share of value added in agriculture, forestry 
and fisheries from national accounts, which was used to select the products for which to compute 
NRAs. The selected products total just over 50 percent of agricultural value added in recent 
years. Figure 2 in the main text shows that these products accounted for an even larger share in 
previous periods.   
 
Exchange rate data and results 
 
Appendix Table 5 presents the exchange-rate data and results from implementation of the 
Anderson et al. (2008) methodology. As described in the text, official exchange rates are from 
IMF (2006a and earlier years). Parallel exchange rates are constructed from the black market 
premiums reported by Easterly (2006) for 1961-1993, extended for 1994-2004 using the year-to-
year changes in real exchange rate misalignment estimated by Elbadawi (2006). The black 
market premium data originate primarily from International Currency Analysis (1993). For later 
years, we infer changes from 1993 using subsequent year-to-year fluctuations in real exchange 
rate misaligment. Those fluctuations are estimated econometrically, using the coefficients from a 
worldwide regression of countries’ Real Effective Exchange Rates against various determinants 
to net out the contribution of each country’s unsustainable fiscal and monetary policy changes to  
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its own REER, so as to compute changes in the marginal opportunity cost of foreign exchange. 
The last column of Appendix Table 5 shows our estimate of the equilibrium exchange rate that 
would apply in the absence of distortions. Following the Anderson et al. (2008) methodology, 
this is intermediate between the official exchange rate and the marginal cost of foreign exchange, 
which is obtained from either the black market rate (for 1993 and earlier) or econometric 
estimation (for 1994 and later).   
The exchange-rate distortion calculations suggest that there was only a slight 
overvaluation in Cameroon before the devaluation of 1994, of between 10 and 25 percent in the 
1960s, below 5 percent for most of the 1970s, and just above 5 percent in the three years prior to 
devaluation. This measure deliberately omits all Dutch Disease effects other than those which 
affect the nominal exchange rate: we consider changes in nontradable goods prices to be a change 
in fundamental equilibrium conditions, rather than a distortion. By this measure, devaluation in 
1994 resulted in very large undervaluation of the currency for several years, until macroeconomic 
policies in Cameroon caused domestic prices to catch up and ultimately return to earlier levels of 
overvaluation in 2003 and 2004.   
 
Individual commodity data and results 
 
Annual NRAs are shown in Appendix Table 6 and detailed intermediate results for individual 
commodities in each year are presented in the Appendix Tables 7-10. The latter show our 
calculation of a representative wholesale (‘domestic’) price in nominal CFA Francs, including 
marketing margins from farms to the principal urban market, and then a free-trade (‘border’) 
price in nominal US dollars for that same product. The percentage difference between the two 
prices after conversion into a common currency at the undistorted exchange rate are also shown. 
The Consumer Tax Equivalent (CTE) measures the incidence of policy on consumer expenditure, 
which is the same as the percentage difference between the producer and border prices on output 
plus or minus any tax or subsidy on transactions between wholesalers and consumers. A more 
comprehensive measure of distortions to incentives for invidual commodities is then shown, 
which is the the percentage difference between the producer and border prices on output plus or 
minus any input price distortions or other taxes and subsidies captured in our data. Each price and 
level of distortion is shown separately for each primary product and its lightly processed version. 
It is this final measure incuding the output price equivalent of any input price distortions that  
subsequently becomes the NRA after adjusting for any exchange rate distortion.   
Appendix Table 7 shows our main results for coffee, first in its primary form (“green” or 
raw coffee beans) and then as its principal lightly processed product (roasted beans). For the 
primary product, wholesale prices are computed from a farmgate price plus a marketing margin.  
Farmgate prices are assembled from MINAGRI (the ‘Bilan Diagnostique du Secteur Agricole de 
1960 à 1980’, INS (‘Le Cameroun en Chiffres, 2005’), plus file data from MINEFI/DSCN. The 
marketing margin and wholesale prices are from file data of the National Council of Coffee and 
Cocoa (CNCC), who estimate a competitive farm-to-market margin of around 20 percent from 
the 1960s, rising to 27 percent after devaluation. For the processed product, wholesale prices are 
drawn from file data of the ‘Brulerie Moderne’. Unit values for the export of raw beans and the 
import of roasted beans are from FAOStat file data. NRAs on output are computed directly from 
these price data, plus the exchange rates in Appendix Table 5. NRAs on output of primary 
production include fiscal subsidies to parastatals. These data are due to Varlet (2002), 
‘Institutions publiques et croissance agricole au Cameroun’ (Thèse de Doctorat, Ecole Nationale 
Supérieure Agronomique de Montpellier, France), who found significant payments from central  
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government into various government-owned producers from 1974 through 1988. The NRAs for 
the processing sector are very large, as processors benefit from both low purchase prices for raw 
beans and high sale prices for roasted ones.   
Appendix Table 8 shows the same data for cocoa, except that in this case both the raw 
beans and the processed products are exportable. All data sources are the same as for coffee, but 
the farm-to-market margins are from CIC-CACAO, and are estimated to be somewhat lower than 
for coffee, with an ad-valorem rate of about 17 percent in the 1960s rising to a peak of 21 percent 
in 2004. For the processed products, wholesale prices are from CHOCOCAM. Results are 
broadly similar to coffee, except that the NRA on output against producers is even larger and the 
NRA on output favoring processors is much smaller. The processors benefitted from the very low 
purchase price for raw beans, but some of those gains were eroded by the negative NRA on 
output lowering the sale price of their processed cocoa.   
Appendix Table 9 shows the main results for cotton, which is not tradable as a primary 
product (seed cotton) but exportable once lightly processed (as cotton lint). All domestic price 
data are from SODECOTON for 1968-2003, and extrapolated back to 1961 due to missing data. 
The marketing margin for the primary product from farm to market is estimated using actual 
SODECOTON accounting data for 1990 to 2003 and inferred for previous years: the result is a 
margin of about 22 percent, with some fluctuation in the 1990s. These margins are used only for 
constructing our value-weighted averages. The distortion estimates for primary production of 
cotton come from exchange-rate effects only, because we see limited pass-through to farmers of 
price changes on the tradable processed product.   
Apendix Table 10 shows our data for seven commodities with no significant processing 
sector. Bananas are directly exportable as a primary product, and the other six are considered here 
to be nontradable. (There is some international trade in all of these products, but even without 
government restrictions the volume of trade would be too small and localized to influence 
national prices.) For bananas, domestic prices and marketing margins are from the Plantation du 
Haut Penja (PHP), which estimates a farm-to-port cost of 40 percent for the entire period. For the 
other food crops, all prices are from the file data of INS. Since we have no price-comparison data 
with which to infer distortions, we use marketing margins only for the purpose of estimating the 
value of consumption when constructing weighted averages. These margins are estimated by us 
to be 35 percent for plantains, from their main production area in Batchanga to the capital 
Yaoundé, 45 percent for maize from Ngaoundéré to Yaoundé, and 10-20 percent for cassava and 
other roots and tubers over the short distance from Obala to Yaoundé. For millet, we estimate a 
small margin of 15 percent from rural to urban Garoua, which is the main area of both production 
and consumption, and for sorghum we apply no margin at all on the assumption that essentially 
all consumption occurs locally within rural areas.    
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Sources: PWT data (1960-2000) are RGDPCH from Penn World Tables 6.1 (2002);















































Source: FAOSTAT (2006).  
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Source: Calculated from data in FAOSTAT (2006)  
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Appendix Table 1: Evolution of public agencies and enterprises in Cameroon 
Période of 
creation  Agencies/Enterprises Activities/Products Characteristics 
in 1994  Situation in 2005 
WADA Rural  development Liquidated   
WCMB  West Cameroon Marketting 
Board 
Liquidated in 





SOSUCAM Sugar  cane Monopoly  In partnership with 
private sector  
ZAPI-EST & ZAPI 
CENTRE  Rural development  Liquidated   





CENADEC Cooperative  development  Liquidated   
SODENKAM Rural  development  Liquidated   
UNVDA (Rice 
cultivation in the 
North West) 
Development of farmlands, 







OCB Banana  Privatised in 
1990                     
SEMRY (Rice 
cultivation in the 
North) 
Development of farmlands, 
Hiring of equipment  Rice 
hauling 
Cartel Restructured 
MIDEVIV  Foodstuff trading   Liquidated   
MIDERIN or 
SODERIM (Rice 
cultivation in the 
West) 
Development of farmlands, 
Hiring of equipment and Rice 
hauling 
Cartel   Activities have 
slowed down 
MIDO Agricultural  development  Liquidated   
Nord-Est Benoué  Cotton and food crops  Liquidated   
SODECAO 
Training and supervision of 
peasants, phytosanitary treatment 
of plantations  
Monopoly of 




Plan 1971-75  









Appendix Table 1 (cont’d): Evolution of public agencies and enterprises in Cameroon  
Période of 
creation  Agencies/Enterprises Activities/Products Characteristics 
in 1994  Situation in 2005 
PMO  Produce Marketting Organization  Liquidated in 
1974   
SODEBLE or 
SODEMAIS  Wheat or Maize  Monopoly  Liquidated 
SODECOTON* 
Training and supervision, credits 
to production, productions: cotton 
fibber, oil and cake marketing 
Monopoly of 
the sector  
Undergoing 
privatisation 
CAMSUCO Sugar  Cartel    Privatized (bought 
by SOSUCAM) 
CDC*  Banana, palm oil, tea, palm nuts, 
rubber 
Monopoly of 
tea and rubber 
Banana and tea parts 
privatised 
SCT* Tobacco  development  Liquidated   










CENEEMA  Supply of agricultural equipment  Privatised   
MIDIMA  Development of mounts Mandara  Liquidated   












Agri-Lagdo  Sugar cane, rice and other food 
crops  Liquidated  
 West  Corn  Maize  Liquidated   
  Hauts Plateaux de 
l’Ouest  Arabica coffee and food crops  Liquidated   
 SOFIBEL  Timber    Liquidated   
  ONCPB (NPMB)  Marketing of export products, 
financing of subventions  Monopoly   Liquidated 
Continued ..  
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Appendix Table 1 (cont’d): Evolution of public agencies and enterprises in Cameroon 
Période of 
creation  Agencies/Enterprises Activities/Products Characteristics 
in 1994  Situation in 2005 
MIDENO All  crops  Liquidated   






MEAL  All crops (studies and planning)  Liquidated   
 SOMUDER 
(SOCOOPED) 
Saving and Cooperative 
development  Liquidated  
 ONDAPB  Small  livestock  Liquidated   
  ONAREF Forestry  development    Restructured 
and Liquidated   
  CENADEFOR Forestry  development  Restructured 
and Liquidated   
  PNVRA  Vulgarisation of interface 
research results-production  Monopoly  Activities have 
slowed down 
 
SNAR   Prevent food insecurity  
End of Japanese 
grants, 




 CELLUCAM  Paper  pulp  Liquidated   
 COCAM Veneer  Wood  Privatised   
 
IRAD 
Development of research 
(selected seedlings of maize, 
cassava, palm oil…) 
Monopoly  Activities have 
slowed down 
Source: Adapted from Bamou, Njinkeu and Douya (2003).  
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Appendix Table 2: Food balance sheet data, Cameroon, 1961 and 2003 
 
   Self-sufficiency 
ratio  Dietary composition 
   (Production 
/Utilization)  (percent of calories) 
   1961 2003 1961  2003
Total number of calories       2,038       2,286 
  Cereals - excluding beer  0.95 0.68 45.7 percent  40.7 percent
   Wheat  0.00 1.5 percent  5.7 percent
   Rice (milled equivalent)  0.05 0.29 0.7 percent  9.1 percent
   Maize  1.00 0.97 23.2 percent  14.4 percent
   Sorghum  1.00 1.00 14.3 percent  10.0 percent
  Starchy Roots  1.00 1.00 24.4 percent  17.5 percent
   Cassava  1.00 1.00 11.9 percent  12.0 percent
   Roots, Other  1.00 1.00 7.5 percent  2.7 percent
  Sugar and sweeteners  0.21 0.76 0.7 percent  4.5 percent
  Pulses  1.00 1.01 3.2 percent  5.7 percent
  Groundnuts (shelled equiv)  1.18 1.00 4.0 percent  2.4 percent
  Vegetable oils  1.33 0.87 1.3 percent  8.7 percent
   Groundnut oil  0.98 1.00 0.9 percent  0.5 percent
   Soyabean oil   1.0  percent
   Cottonseed oil  1.00 1.00 0.3 percent  1.2 percent
   Palmkernel oil  1.15 0.99 0.1 percent  0.3 percent
   Palm oil  1.33 0.92  5.3  percent
  Vegetables  0.99 0.99 1.2 percent  2.0 percent
  Fruits - excluding wine  1.23 1.18 7.8 percent  6.7 percent
   Bananas  10.63 1.99 0.0 percent  1.2 percent
   Plantains  1.00 1.00 7.0 percent  4.8 percent
  Meat  1.00 0.90 2.5 percent  3.1 percent
    Bovine   1.00 1.00 1.0 percent  1.4 percent
    Poultry   0.98 0.56 0.1 percent  0.5 percent
  Milk - excluding butter  0.89 0.75 0.7 percent  1.2 percent
  Eggs  0.99 1.01 0.0 percent  0.1 percent
  Fish, seafood  1.1 percent  1.1 percent
Notes: Self-sufficiency ratio is computed as production plus stock change, divided by 
total utilization (labeled as "domestic supply" by the FAO). 




Appendix Table 3:  Selected development indicators, Cameroon, 1960 to 2004   
 
   1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 
Population structure            
 
Fertility rate, total  
(births per woman)  5.8  ..  6.2  ..  6.4 6.2 5.9 5.3 4.8 4.8 
 
Age dependency ratio 
(dependents to 
working-age 




population per sq. km 
of arable land)  92.6  94.7  97.9  99.7 101.6 109.5 117.1 123.4 127.2 128.5
Economic structure            
 
Fuel exports (% of 
merchandise exports)  ..  -  -  0.3 30.7  ..  49.9 29.2 54.2 46.7 
 
Agriculture, value 
added (% of GDP)  ..  32.7 31.4 29.1 31.3 21.6 24.6 40.2 38.5 41.1 
 
Aid per capita  
current US$)  0.1  5.3  8.9  14.7 30.3 15.2 38.3 33.4 25.6 47.5 
Health and nutrition            
 
Life expectancy at 
birth, total (years)  39.5  ..  44.6  ..  49.8 52.1 52.4 50.1 47.0 46.0 
 
Malnutrition 
prevalence, height for 
age (% of children 
under  5)  ..  ..  ..  .. 35.6 .. 26.0 ..  .. 31.7 
 
Malnutrition 
prevalence, weight for 
age (% of children 
under  5)  ..  ..  ..  .. 17.3 .. 15.1 ..  .. 18.1 
 
Mortality rate, infant 
(per 1,000 live births)  151  139  127  117  105  91  85  89  88  87.2 
 
Mortality rate, under-5 
(per 1,000)  255 234 215 197 173 147 139 151 151  149.4
Poverty            
 
Poverty gap at $1 a 
day (PPP) (%)  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  9.05  4.1  .. 
 
Poverty gap at $2 a 
day (PPP) (%)  .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  31.16  19.35 .. 
 
Poverty headcount 
ratio at $1 a day (PPP) 
(% of population)  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  32.45  17.11 .. 
 
Poverty headcount 
ratio at $2 a day (PPP) 
(% of population)  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  69.04  50.64 .. 
Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006. 
Notes:  All data are for years shown, except where closest possible year is used instead:  Rural population 
density for 1960 is actually 1961 data.  Malnutrition for 1980 is actually 1978 data, and for 1990 is actually 
1991 data. Poverty gaps and ratios for 1995 are actually 1996 data, and for 2000 are actually 2001 data.  
Rural population density for 2004 is actually 2003 data.  
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exports**  Product Id  Product name 
2000  2002  2000 2002 2000 2002 
001  Subsistence agricultural products  45.2 47.1      
001001002  Rice paddy  1.1 1.0      
001001003  Other Cereals (Wheat, Maize, Millet, Sorghum, 
etc.) 8.4 9.0 8.4  9.0     
001002001  Cassava  6.5 6.8 6.5 6.8     
001002002  Other tubers (Cocoyam, Yam, etc.)  16.4 17.3 16.4 17.3     
001003000  Oleaginous plants (palm excluded)  3.0 3.3      
001004000  Fruits and vegetables (Bananas, Plantain, etc.)  9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8     
002  Perennial products (cash crops)  15.8 14.8      
002001000  Dry cocoa beans   3.9 4.2 3.9 4.2  19.6 43.6
002002001  Arabica coffee  0.8 0.6 0.8 0.6  4.6 2.6
002002002  Robusta coffee  0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3  20.8 9.6
002003000  Seed cotton  2.7 2.6 2.7 2.6  18.4 21.4
002004000  Bananas  4.7 4.0 4.7 4.0  13.1 10.5
002005000  Palm nuts  1.0 1.0      
002006000  Other export products   2.4 2.1      
003  Breeding and Hunting products  14.9 14.5      
003001000  Cattle  4.2 4.1      
003002000  Cheep, goat, pig, etc.  8.1 7.8      
003003000  Other animal products  2.6 2.6      
004  Forestry products  16.6 16.3      
004000001  Logs   12.1 11.8   
004000002  Other forestry products  4.5 4.5      
005  Fishery products  7.5 7.4      
005001000  Marin fish  5.9 5.7      
005002000  Farming and river fish  1.7 1.7            
  Total primary agriculture  100.0 100.0 53.5 54.6  76.5 87.6
Notes: *: Percentage of total agricultural value added;  
  **: Percentage of total agricultural exports. 
Source: National Institute of Statistics (INS) 
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Appendix Table 5: Exchange rates, Cameroon, 1961 to 2004 










1961  245.3 261.2  15.9  253.2 
1962  245.0 248.2  3.2  246.6 
1963  245.0 262.9  17.9  254.0 
1964  245.0 256.0  11.0  250.5 
1965  245.1 266.1  21.0  255.6 
1966  245.7 268.8  23.1  257.2 
1967  246.0 259.2  13.2  252.6 
1968  247.6 259.2  11.7  253.4 
1969  260.0 305.1  45.2  282.5 
1970  276.4 276.7  0.3  276.5 
1971  275.4 278.0  2.6  276.7 
1972  252.0 252.0  0.0  252.0 
1973  222.9 222.9  0.0  222.9 
1974  240.7 240.5  -0.2  240.6 
1975  214.3 210.2  -4.1  212.3 
1976  239.0 237.5  -1.4  238.2 
1977  245.7 246.5  0.8  246.1 
1978  225.7 262.9  37.3  244.3 
1979  212.7 217.0  4.2  214.8 
1980  211.3 206.8  -4.5  209.0 
1981  271.7 274.2  2.4  273.0 
1982  328.6 344.0  15.4  336.3 
1983  381.1 410.9  29.8  396.0 
1984  437.0 443.2  6.3  440.1 
1985  449.3 444.5  -4.7  446.9 
1986  346.3 342.3  -4.0  344.3 
1987  300.5 311.8  11.3  306.2 
1988  297.8 304.8  6.9  301.3 
1989  319.0 337.3  18.3  328.2 
1990  272.3 281.8  9.5  277.0 
1991  282.1 289.0  6.9  285.5 
1992  264.7 270.1  5.4  267.4 
1993  283.2 288.8  5.6  286.0 
1994  555.2 367.0  -188.2  461.1 
1995  499.1 414.2  -85.0  456.7 
1996  511.6 454.5  -57.1  483.0 
1997  583.7 512.2  -71.5  547.9 
1998  590.0 565.1  -24.9  577.5 
1999  615.7 630.4  14.7  623.0 
2000  712.0 650.3  -61.7  681.1 
2001  733.0 694.9  -38.1  714.0 
2002  697.0 685.6  -11.4  691.3 
2003  581.2 597.6  16.4  589.4 
2004  528.3 542.0  13.7  535.1 
Note: Methodology used for estimated equilibrium exchange rate follows Anderson et al. (2008).   
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Appendix Table 6: Annual distortion estimates, Cameroon, 1961 to 2004  
















1961  -3  0 -29 -35  na 0 0 0 0 0 -3  -4 
1962  -1  0 -28 -38  na 0 0 0 0 0 -1  -4 
1963  -4  0 -37 -26  na 0 0 0 0 0 -4  -5 
1964  -2  0 -21 -26  na 0 0 0 0 0 -2  -4 
1965  -4  0 -31 -34  na 0 0 0 0 0 -4  -5 
1966  -4  0 -43 -30  na 0 0 0 0 0 -4  -6 
1967  -3  0 -50 -29  na 0 0 0 0 0 -3  -8 
1968  -2  0 -55 -30  na 0 0 0 0 0 -2  -9 
1969  -8  0 -61 -35  na 0 0 0 0 0 -8 -13 
1970  0  0 -46 -43 -34 0 0 0 0 0 0 -12 
1971  0  0 -29 -44 -46 0 0 0 0 0 0  -9 
1972  0  0 -35 -43 -37 0 0 0 0 0 0  -9 
1973  0  0 -53 -39 -64 0 0 0 0 0 0 -13 
1974  0  0 -61 -48 -39 0 0 0 0 0 0 -16 
1975  1  0 -42 -37 -46 0 0 0 0 0 1  -8 
1976  0  0 -64 -63 -57 0 0 0 0 0 0 -22 
1977  0  0 -78 -74 -30 0 0 0 0 0 0 -40 
1978  -8  0 -66 -56 -43 0 0 0 0 0 -8 -31 
1979  -1  0 -52 -51 -33 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -25 
1980  1  0 -31 -41 -28 0 0 0 0 0 1 -16 
1981  0  0 -31 -30 -17 0 0 0 0 0 0 -12 
1982  -2  0 -30 -44 -31 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -17 
1983  -4  0 -44 -49 -45 0 0 0 0 0 -4 -20 
1984  -1  0 -53 -55 -25 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -33 
1985  1  0 -37 -44  35 0 0 0 0 0 1 -19 
1986  1  0 -16 -39  45 0 0 0 0 0 1 -15 
1987  -2 0  -1 1  20 0 0 0 0 0 -2 0 
1988  -1 0  17 3  32 0 0 0 0 0 -1 4 
1989  -3 0  27 4  -41 0 0 0 0 0 -3 3 
1990  -2  0 -15 -10 -28 0 0 0 0 0 -2  -3 
1991  -1  0 -23  -4 -11 0 0 0 0 0 -1  -3 
1992  -1  0  -19 17 14 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 
1993  -1  0 -44 -11  46 0 0 0 0 0 -1  -4 
1994  20  0 -63 -70 -44 0 0 0 0 0 20 -13 
1995  9  0 -18 -27 -25 0 0 0 0 0 9  -4 
1996  6 0  -32 6  -22 0 0 0 0 0 6  -2 
1997  7  0 -46  -4 -21 0 0 0 0 0 7  -6 
1998  2 0  -51  -8 4 0 0 0 0 0 2  -7 
1999  -1  0 -24 -10  -6 0 0 0 0 0 -1  -4 
2000  5 0  -20  -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 5  -1 
2001  3 0  -15  -8 8 0 0 0 0 0 3  -1 
2002  1  0 -20  -9 -11 0 0 0 0 0 1  -3 
2003  -1 0  -9 0  -21 0 0 0 0 0 -1  -2 




Appendix Table 6 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Cameroon, 1961 to 2004  
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b and 
import-competing
b agricultural industries, and relative
c to non-agricultural industries  (percent) 
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Covered products 














1961 0  -3 -1  -3  -17  na  -15 18  -29 
1962 0  -3 0 -3  -16 na  -14  19  -27 
1963 0  -4 -1  -3  -19  na  -17 17  -30 
1964 0  -3 -1  -2  -14  na  -12 18  -24 
1965 0  -4 -1  -4  -20  na  -18 20  -30 
1966 0  -5 -1  -4  -22  na  -21 25  -34 
1967 0  -6 -1  -5  -24  na  -24 24  -39 
1968 0  -7 -1  -7  -28  na  -27 27  -41 
1969 0  -10 -2  -10  -36  na  -35 26  -49 
1970 0  -8 0 -8  -30 na  -28  23  -43 
1971 0  -6 0 -6  -24 na  -23  24  -37 
1972 0  -6 0 -5  -24 na  -22  29  -37 
1973 0  -9 0 -8  -31 na  -28  28  -44 
1974 0  -11 0  -10  -37 na  -34  24  -48 
1975 0  -5 0 -4  -23 na  -18  31  -34 
1976 0  -12 0  -12  -38 na  -36  38  -51 
1977 0  -22 0  -22  -52 na  -51  30  -64 
1978 0  -20 -2  -19  -46  na  -44 24  -57 
1979 0  -16 0  -15  -37 na  -35  26  -48 
1980 0  -10 0 -9  -25 na  -23  25  -39 
1981 0  -8 0 -7  -20 na  -18  27  -35 
1982 0  -11 -1  -10  -27  na  -25 34  -41 
1983 0  -12 -1  -12  -33  na  -31 35  -48 
1984 0  -20 0  -19  -41 na  -39  34  -55 
1985 0  -11 0  -10  -27 na  -25  32  -44 
1986 0  -9 0 -8  -20 na  -18  22  -38 
1987 0  0 -1  1  0  na 3 18  -15 
1988 0  2 0  3 6 na  8  17  -9 
1989 0  1 -1  2  4  na 6 17  -9 
1990 0  -2 -1  -1 -6  na  -5 13  -19 
1991 0  -2 0 -1  -5 na  -4  14  -15 
1992 0  0  0  0 -1  na 0 16  -13 
1993 0  -2 0 -2  -7 na  -6  35  -19 
1994 0  -2 6 -1  -5 na  -4  21  -29 
1995 0  -1 3  0  -2 na  -1  17  -18 
1996 0  0  2  0 -1  na 0 17  -14 
1997 0  -2 2 -2  -6 na  -5  21  -19 
1998 0  -3 1 -3  -10 na  -9  16  -25 
1999 0  -2 0 -2  -6 na  -6  16  -19 
2000 0  0 1  0 0 na  1  17  -13 
2001 0  0 1  0 0 na  1  16  -14 
2002 0  -1 0 -1  -4 na  -4  13  -17 
2003 0  -1 0 -1  -4 na  -3  12  -15 
2004 0  1 0  1 2 na  3  0  -9  
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Appendix Table 6 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Cameroon, 1961 to 2004  
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered
a and non-covered products, (percent) 
 Banana 
Cassav










1961  1 5 5  na.  18 2 12 3 17 7 30 
1962  1 5 4  na.  16 2 11 3 18 9 30 
1963  1 6 4  na.  14 2 11 3 20 9 30 
1964  1 6 6  na.  13 2 11 3 15 13 30 
1965  1 4 7  na.  15 2 11 4 17 9 30 
1966  1 6 6  na.  13 2 12 4 16 9 30 
1967  1 7 7  na.  11 2 9 4 20 11 29 
1968  1 8 7  na.  12 1 7 4 20 11 28 
1969  1 11  7  na. 12 2 9 3 18 8 29 
1970  1 9 9 0  11 1 7 3 20 8 28 
1971  1 8 9 0  12 2 8 3 19 9 30 
1972  1 7 8 0  11 1 7 4 20 10 31 
1973  1  10 7 0  10 1 6 3 19 10 31 
1974  1  11 8 0 9 1 5 3 20 10 30 
1975  1 6 7 1  12 1 7 4 20 10 31 
1976  1 8  11 1 7 1 4 3 15 7 42 
1977  1 14 16  0  5 1 3 3 9 6 44 
1978  1 15 15  1  5 1 5 3 8 9 38 
1979  1 15 14  1  5 1 5 3 8 9 39 
1980  1 12 15  1  5 1 6 4 9 10 37 
1981  1 12 12  1  5 1 4 4 10 10 39 
1982  1 10 17  1  5 1 4 4 9 9 39 
1983  1 14 10  2  5 1 4 5 9 12 39 
1984  1 15 21  1  3 0 2 4 6 7 39 
1985  1 14 14  1  3 0 4 6 7 10 40 
1986  1 11 19  1  3 1 6 1 8 11 39 
1987  1  12 9 1 4 0 3 6 11 10 43 
1988  1 9  10 1 3 0 5 5 10 8 48 
1989  4 7 9 1 3 0 4 5 10 10 47 
1990  8 5 4 1 3 0 4 6 12 8 50 
1991  9 5 5 1 3 0 4 7 10 8 48 
1992  8 4 2 1 3 0 4 7 9 9 53 
1993  3 4 3 1 3 0 4 7 12 10 54 
1994  6 4 5 1 3 0 3 5 5 8 59 
1995  8 5 5 1 5 1 4 5 7 8 51 
1996  7 5 5 1 4 1 4 5 7 7 54 
1997  4 6 3 1 5 1 4 6 10 8 53 
1998  4 6 8 1 5 1 6 5 10 8 47 
1999  4 4 6 1 6 1 3 5 13 6 52 
2000  3 3 3 1 5 0 3 7 14 8 52 
2001  2 3 1 1 4 0 5 7 12 7 58 
2002  2 5 2 1 4 1 6 7 11 7 55 
2003  3 6 2 1 5 1 6 7 14 8 46 
2004  3 7 2 1 5 1 5 5 15 10 46 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product-specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.   
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t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
d. At farmgate undistorted prices, US$  
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Appendix Table 7: Prices and distortions to incentives for coffee, Cameroon, 1961 to 2004 
   Coffee (primary) - exportable    Coffee (processed) - importable 









1961   110055  668  -0.349  -0.349     164900  513  0.268  1.567  
1962   103845  681  -0.382  -0.382     156220  525  0.206  1.619  
1963   117300  622  -0.258  -0.258     167035  582  0.130  0.917  
1964   146050  785  -0.258  -0.258     212155  611  0.385  1.331  
1965   115000  677  -0.335  -0.335     185450  515  0.410  1.670  
1966   132250  738  -0.303  -0.303     186760  490  0.481  1.784  
1967   132250  738  -0.290  -0.290     196400  495  0.569  1.804  
1968   132250  745  -0.299  -0.299     197780  700  0.114  1.024  
1969   134550  728  -0.346  -0.346     200190  872  -0.188  0.637  
1970   143750  912  -0.430  -0.430     266385  657  0.466  2.170  
1971   143750  930  -0.441  -0.441     286100  560  0.847  2.939  
1972   143750  994  -0.426  -0.426     246200  549  0.778  2.981  
1973   149500  1098  -0.389  -0.389     285950  949  0.352  1.637  
1974   155250  1291  -0.500  -0.479     328980  1554  -0.120  1.067  
1975   166750  1343  -0.415  -0.370     284850  1542  -0.130  0.903  
1976   224250  2808  -0.665  -0.632     452360  1494  0.271  3.839  
1977   287500  4923  -0.763  -0.739     892180  3395  0.068  3.228  
1978   322000  3244  -0.594  -0.561     801770  3658  -0.103  1.402  
1979   356500  3640  -0.544  -0.508     711980  3703  -0.105  1.423  
1980   368000  3237  -0.456  -0.408     803080  3062  0.255  1.632  
1981   396000  2264  -0.359  -0.300     640630  2038  0.152  1.292  
1982   420000  2443  -0.489  -0.438     793520  2093  0.127  1.757  
1983   468000  2731  -0.567  -0.491     914880  1718  0.345  2.921  
1984   540000  3040  -0.596  -0.550     1005900  1959  0.167  2.812  
1985   552000  2667  -0.537  -0.439     1258900  1773  0.588  2.896  
1986   624000  3263  -0.445  -0.390     1101070  1879  0.702  2.909  
1987   624000  2251  -0.095  0.010     724740  1694  0.397  0.757  
1988   624000  2092  -0.010  0.028     667025  1515  0.461  0.501  
1989   570000  1665  0.043  0.043     633690  1497  0.290  0.153  
1990   300000  1210  -0.105  -0.105     346340  1608  -0.222  0.003  
1991   300000  1096  -0.042  -0.042     336770  1901  -0.379  -0.311  
1992   300000  960  0.169  0.169     383360  1746  -0.179  -0.444  
1993   300000  1177  -0.109  -0.109     310580  1320  -0.177  0.099  
1994   360000  2636  -0.704  -0.704     1173795  1353  0.881  4.797  
1995   930000  2790  -0.270  -0.270     1269765  1866  0.490  1.644  
1996   930000  1823  0.056  0.056     1008100  1583  0.319  0.133  
1997   936000  1775  -0.038  -0.038     1024000  2125  -0.121  -0.030  
1998   985000  1846  -0.076  -0.076     1650500  2018  0.416  0.616  
1999   830000  1488  -0.105  -0.105     1092040  2485  -0.295  -0.115  
2000   600000  927  -0.050  -0.050     873470  1295  -0.010  0.093  
2001   395000  601  -0.080  -0.080     907095  1212  0.048  0.161  
2002   425000  678  -0.093  -0.093     870280  1918  -0.343  -0.249  
2003   500000  844  0.005  0.005     866000  2783  -0.472  -0.476  
2004     490000  820  0.117  0.117       425893  4203  -0.811  -0.876  
Note: Domestic prices are wholesale at Douala or closest major market, in CFAF/mt. Border prices are unit values at 
Douala, fob (exports) or cif (imports), in US$/mt. * includes output price equivalent of input distortions in 
numerator. Sources and assumptions are as detailed in the text.  
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Appendix Table 8: Prices and distortions to incentives for cocoa, Cameroon, 1961 to 2004 
  Cocoa (primary) - exportable    Cocoa (processed) - exportable 









1961 87750 485  -0.286  -0.286      104757 513  -0.194 0.144   
1962 81970 459  -0.276  -0.276      104503 525  -0.193 0.109   
1963 87865 552  -0.374  -0.374      109950 582  -0.256 0.188   
1964 99625 504  -0.211  -0.211      113932 611  -0.256  -0.039   
1965 64494 365  -0.309  -0.309     91719 515  -0.303  -0.027   
1966 76257 518  -0.427  -0.427     94187 490  -0.253 0.313   
1967 76295 598  -0.495  -0.495      132908 495  0.062 0.811   
1968 82205 721  -0.550  -0.550      161122 700  -0.092 0.617   
1969 99872 903  -0.609  -0.609      218032 872  -0.116 0.674   
1970 99925 674  -0.464  -0.464      207597 657  0.142 0.739   
1971  105860 539  -0.290  -0.290      161448 560  0.042 0.391   
1972  105920 643  -0.346  -0.346      142349 549  0.028 0.535   
1973 117755 1131 -0.533  -0.533      208119  949  -0.016  0.779   
1974 141389 1560 -0.623  -0.605     336895 1554  -0.099  0.685   
1975 141474 1246 -0.465  -0.415     330994 1542 0.011  0.482   
1976 153357 2046 -0.685  -0.639     350749 1494  -0.015  1.161   
1977 177062 3791 -0.810  -0.779     679646 3395  -0.186  0.948   
1978 259860 3405 -0.688  -0.655     685647 3658  -0.233  0.569   
1979 307308 3293 -0.566  -0.525     636074 3703  -0.200  0.430   
1980 342998 2603 -0.370  -0.308     529087 3062  -0.173  0.220   
1981 355072 2077 -0.374  -0.309     471460 2038  -0.152  0.324   
1982 367167 1742 -0.373  -0.303     581916 2093  -0.173  0.216   
1983 391140 2119 -0.534  -0.437     617669 1718  -0.092  0.733   
1984 438877 2396 -0.584  -0.526     766780 1959  -0.110  0.784   
1985 522305 2255 -0.482  -0.367     727215 1773  -0.082  0.685   
1986 534592 2068 -0.249  -0.164     672610 1879 0.040  0.384   
1987 535020 1998 -0.125  -0.008     532805 1694 0.027  0.212   
1988  535460 1584 0.122  0.172     466531 1515  0.022 -0.138   
1989  518043 1242 0.271  0.271     518927 1497  0.056 -0.226   
1990 297980 1268 -0.152  -0.152     364951 1608  -0.181 -0.031   
1991 262316 1193 -0.230  -0.230     243327 1901  -0.552 -0.371   
1992 238554 1099 -0.189  -0.189     318962 1746  -0.317 -0.168   
1993 178980 1111 -0.437  -0.437     109501 1320  -0.710 -0.249   
1994 238725 1396 -0.629  -0.629     654894 1353 0.049  0.862   
1995 537329 1433 -0.179  -0.179     608103 1866  -0.286 -0.115   
1996 477802 1455 -0.320  -0.320     622604 1583  -0.186  0.183   
1997 477980 1619 -0.461  -0.461     877476 2125  -0.246  0.194   
1998 478160 1676 -0.506  -0.506     882336 2018  -0.243  0.284   
1999 538135 1135 -0.239  -0.239     771853 1656  -0.252 -0.047   
2000 495000  904 -0.196  -0.196      661370 1295  -0.250  -0.079   
2001 657500 1088 -0.154  -0.154     765574 1212  -0.115  0.058   
2002 985000 1779 -0.199  -0.199     991625 1918  -0.252 -0.021   
2003 945000 1753 -0.085  -0.085     804778 2783  -0.509 -0.442   
2004 850000 1551 0.024  0.024       805306 2226  -0.324 -0.345   
Note: Domestic prices are wholesale at Douala or closest major market, in CFAF/mt. Border prices are unit values at 
Douala, fob (exports) or cif (imports), in US$/mt. * includes output price equivalent of input distortions in 
numerator. Sources and assumptions are as detailed in the text.  
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Appendix Table 9: Prices and distortions to incentives for cotton, Cameroon, 1961 to 2004 
  Cotton (primary) - nontradable    Cotton (processed) - exportable 








BP   
1961  30000 n.a.  -0.239  -0.239    132717  686  -0.168  -0.009  
1962  30000 n.a.  -0.207  -0.207    132717  686  -0.146  -0.009  
1963  30000 n.a.  -0.242  -0.242    132717  686  -0.171  -0.008  
1964  30000 n.a.  -0.226  -0.226    132717  686  -0.159  -0.009  
1965  30000 n.a.  -0.250  -0.250    132717  686  -0.176  -0.008  
1966  30000 n.a.  -0.257  -0.257    132717  686  -0.181  -0.008  
1967  30000 n.a.  -0.236  -0.236    132717  686  -0.166  -0.009  
1968  30000 n.a.  -0.240  -0.240    132717  686  -0.169  -0.009  
1969  30000 n.a.  -0.361  -0.361    132717  686  -0.254  0.004  
1970  30000 n.a.  -0.338  -0.338    132717  686  -0.238  0.000  
1971  31000 n.a.  -0.463  -0.463    137216  819  -0.348  0.000  
1972  38000 n.a.  -0.369  -0.369    155096  919  -0.279  0.000  
1973  40000 n.a.  -0.637  -0.637    164542  1686  -0.534  0.000  
1974  45000 n.a.  -0.386  -0.386    182294  1158  -0.291  0.000  
1975  45000 n.a.  -0.457  -0.457    184510  1439  -0.348  0.000  
1976  55000 n.a.  -0.568  -0.568    221796  1843  -0.461  0.000  
1977  65000 n.a.  -0.298  -0.298    254101  1434  -0.223  0.000  
1978  65000 n.a.  -0.426  -0.426    257369  1677  -0.324  0.000  
1979  70000 n.a.  -0.334  -0.334    284503  1883  -0.243  0.000  
1980  80000 n.a.  -0.278  -0.278    321725  2076  -0.200  0.000  
1981  90000 n.a.  -0.171  -0.171    356959  1627  -0.119  0.000  
1982  105000 n.a.  -0.306  -0.306    401577  1690  -0.226  0.000  
1983  117000 n.a.  -0.454  -0.454    446774  1933  -0.358  0.000  
1984  130000 n.a.  -0.254  -0.254    488095  1525  -0.187  0.000  
1985  140000 n.a.  0.355  0.355    515452  1080  0.218  0.000  
1986  150000 n.a.  0.453  0.453    542469  1368  0.279  0.000  
1987  140000 n.a.  0.199  0.199    504980  1602  0.131  0.000  
1988  140000 n.a.  0.316  0.316    477882  1459  0.204  0.000  
1989  95000 n.a.  -0.414  -0.414    371723  1767  -0.305  0.000  
1990  95000 n.a.  -0.284  -0.284    369134  1811  -0.199  0.000  
1991  95000 n.a.  -0.109  -0.109    361981  1496  -0.072  0.000  
1992  85000 n.a.  0.140  0.140    337965  1305  0.079  0.000  
1993  130000 n.a.  0.460  0.460    480111  1495  0.264  0.000  
1994  155000 n.a.  -0.436  -0.436    573385  2022  -0.337  0.000  
1995  180000 n.a.  -0.246  -0.246    659534  1912  -0.181  0.000  
1996  180000 n.a.  -0.221  -0.221    660556  1764  -0.158  0.000  
1997  190000 n.a.  -0.211  -0.211    705640  1641  -0.151  0.000  
1998  195000 n.a.  0.036  0.036    728444  1345  0.024  0.000  
1999  165000 n.a.  -0.062  -0.062    653451  1199  -0.040  0.000  
2000  225000 n.a.  0.005  0.005    803871  1275  0.003  0.000  
2001  175000 n.a.  0.085  0.085    670582  975  0.052  0.000  
2002  180000 n.a.  -0.109  -0.109    687040  1160  -0.073  0.000  
2003  185000 n.a.  -0.206  -0.206    695430  1469  -0.144  0.000  
2004  190000 n.a.  0.297  0.297    717686  1229  0.174  0.000  
Note: Domestic prices are wholesale at Douala or closest major market, in CFAF/mt. Border prices are unit values at 
Douala, fob (exports) or cif (imports), in US$/mt. * includes output price equivalent of input distortions in 
numerator. Sources and assumptions are as detailed in the text.  
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Appendix Table 10: Prices and distortions to incentives for staples, Cameroon, 1961 to 2004 
  Bananas (primary) - exportable    Plant. Maize Millet Sorgh. Cassav. Oth.Rts.




    BP      (Nontradable and not processed - domestic prices only) 
1961 15906  65  -0.031  -0.031     26520  131680  47330 70000  8640  40160
1962 15872  65  -0.007  -0.007     27480  129595  47550 70000  9000  41135
1963 15927  65  -0.035  -0.035     28480  127540  47775 70000  9400  42145
1964 15766  64  -0.022  -0.022     29510  125520  48000 70000  9800  43190
1965 15758  64  -0.041  -0.041     30585  123535  48225 70000  10200  44280
1966 15933  65  -0.045  -0.045     31695  121575  48460 70000  10700  45400
1967 14704  60  -0.026  -0.026     32845  119650  48680 70000  11100  46575
1968 15094  61  -0.023  -0.023     34040  117755  48910 70000  11580  47790
1969 14982  58  -0.080  -0.080     35275  115890  49140 70000  12100  49050
1970 14683  53  0.000  0.000     36550  114055  49370 70000  12600  50355
1971 15259  55  -0.005  -0.005     37880  112250  49600 70000  13200  51715
1972 15374  61  0.000  0.000     39255  110470  49840 70000  13695  53130
1973 16047  72  0.000  0.000     40680  108720  50070 70000  14280  54600
1974 17600  73  0.000  0.000     42160  107000  50310 70000  14900  56125
1975 17785  83  0.010  0.010     43685  105300  50550 70000  15550  57715
1976 17174  72  0.003  0.003     45275  103635  50780 70000  16190  59370
1977 17372  71  -0.002  -0.002     46915  101995  51030 70000  16885  61090
1978 17544  78  -0.076  -0.076     48620  100380  51260 70000  17600  62880
1979  17655  83  -0.010  -0.010      50385 98790 51510  70000  18360  64745
1980  17723  84  0.011  0.011      52215 97225 51745  70000  19150  66670
1981  17326  64  -0.004  -0.004      54110 95685 51990  70000  20000  68715
1982  18135  55  -0.023  -0.023      56070 94170 52230  70000  20800  70820
1983  14819  39  -0.038  -0.038      58105 92675 52480  70000  21710  73020
1984  15142  35  -0.007  -0.007      60220 91210 52730  70000  22650  75315
1985  15132  34  0.005  0.005      62400 89765 52970  70000  23600  77700
1986  15016  43  0.006  0.006      64670 88340 53230  70000  2460  80200
1987  15108  50  -0.018  -0.018      67015 86945 53475  70000  25650  82800
1988  15051  51  -0.012  -0.012      69445 85565 53725  70000  26765  85510
1989  55743  175  -0.028  -0.028      71970 84210 53980  70000  27910  88350
1990 115189  423  -0.017  -0.017      74580 82875 54230  70000  29100  91310
1991 121598  431  -0.012  -0.012      77290 81565 54485  70000  30350  94400
1992 106349  402  -0.010  -0.010      80095 80270 54745  70000  31650  97630
1993  37836  134  -0.010  -0.010      83000 79000 55000  70000  33000 101000
1994  203206  366  0.204  0.204    127335 175085 150900  143340  56500  88875
1995  201478  404  0.093  0.093    115225 194250 190260  131700  55400  114860
1996  200722  392  0.059  0.059    108705 169165 175940  141200  51900  131920
1997  160756  275  0.065  0.065    128950 208030 191280  159150  63800  180380
1998  160696  272  0.022  0.022    129460 199780 292865  200600  57770  173040
1999  160455  261  -0.012  -0.012    121625 214150 266150  202700  52500  162130
2000  145737  205  0.045  0.045    145705 208890 174170  118200  70800  185375
2001  137744  188  0.027  0.027    161990 192765 243170  201500  91020  192970
2002  132208  190  0.008  0.008    168445 183165 300640  229550  92270  181340
2003  131501  226  -0.014  -0.014    148225 180515 217120  164300  72960  163325
2004  107177  203  -0.013  -0.013     164585 165585 199400  131255  84240  172300
Note: Domestic prices are wholesale at Douala or closest major market, in CFAF/mt. Border prices are unit values at 
Douala, fob (exports) or cif (imports), in US$/mt. * includes output price equivalent of input distortions in 
numerator. Sources and assumptions are as detailed in the text. 